The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015, aimed to resolve a major point of contention surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. It was seen as a success for diplomacy and peace in addressing Middle East issues. However, the UN Security Council voted to completely scrap the JCPOA on September 27, 2025. Also known as the nuclear agreement, the JCPOA was the reference point for all discussions regarding Iran’s nuclear program during its 10-year lifespan. It was signed after nearly two years of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 countries.
Thanks to this agreement, Iranian politicians Javad Zarif and Hassan Rouhani had emerged as rising stars on the international political stage. Zarif, in particular, attracted attention in Iran and abroad as the “architect of the nuclear agreement.” However, it was inevitable that the springtime of diplomacy would give way to autumn, and before long, winter. My conclusion from this entire process is that geopolitical context will always prevail over diplomacy and technical details.
The nuclear deal takes shape
When Hassan Rouhani was elected President of Iran in 2013, resolving the nuclear issue and freeing Iran from the yoke of sanctions was at the top of his political agenda. He initiated this process immediately after officially taking office in August. In September, former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif met with former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. At that very moment, the heads of state of the two countries made direct contact for the first time since 1979. U.S. President Obama and Iranian President Rouhani held a brief telephone conversation.
The synergy demonstrated by the Rouhani-Zarif and Obama-Kerry pairs soon bore fruit, and in November of that same year, the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) was signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries. This interim agreement envisaged Iran curtailing some of its nuclear activities in exchange for partial sanctions relief. The year 2014 was marked by intense negotiations and two extensions of this interim agreement. Finally, in July 2015, the JCPOA was signed and entered into force in January 2016.
The agreement lifted the stringent UN sanctions imposed on Iran over its nuclear program. Iran, in turn, would allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor its nuclear facilities. These inspections would ensure that the uranium enrichment rate did not exceed 3.67 per cent and that the amount of enriched uranium did not exceed 202 kilograms. The agreement was welcomed in Iran and Western circles. Iran was escaping sanctions, and Western countries were finding a diplomatic solution to the so called “Iran problem.”
Trump’s withdrawal, Iran’s response and stalled negotiations
On May 8, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the U.S. from the nuclear agreement, which he had criticized throughout his 2016 election campaign as a product of the Obama administration’s misguided Iran policy. Trump aimed to negotiate a more favorable agreement with Iran and settle scores with the Obama administration. Trump’s decision provoked a strong reaction in Iran and among the other parties to the agreement, and its effects were soon felt.
While the other parties to the agreement—the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China—verbally emphasized their commitment to the agreement, the Europeans began suspending their economic relations with Iran when the United States’ secondary sanctions were directed at them. Consequently, the agreement became ineffective.
Between 2016 and 2018, European companies had eagerly entered the Iranian market. However, they gradually began to withdraw. This set off alarm bells in the Iranian economy. In response, Iran increased its uranium enrichment rates and stockpiled enriched uranium. Iran claimed that the nuclear agreement gave them this right and argued that the U.S.’s unilateral withdrawal from the agreement was contrary to international law. The agreement had been ratified by the UN and was multilateral in nature. It bound not only Obama, but also Trump, within the framework of legal continuity. However, Trump was not concerned with international legal requirements.
Implications for US withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement
Trump’s withdrawal dealt a major blow to the agreement. The agreement effectively became defunct. The severe damage to the Iranian economy, compounded by the global COVID19 pandemic in 2020, made the defunct nature of the nuclear agreement even more apparent. Iran experienced a major social crisis. Gradually, the nuclear agreement and negotiations began to lose importance in Iran’s foreign policy. The loss of importance of the nuclear agreement resulted in the decline of moderate and reformist politics in Iran. Ebrahim Raeisi won the 2021 presidential election. Raeisi’s foreign policy priorities were guided by an approach known as the “Look East” policy. This approach would abandon the Western orientation of the Rouhani era and emphasize developing relations with actors such as Russia and China.
As the Russia-Ukraine war entered a new phase in February 2022, Iran’s military support for Russia became a topic of hot debate. Collectively taking a stance against Russia, Western countries began to criticize Iran for its drone support to Russia. For this reason, despite the resumption of negotiations, Iran-U.S. relations could not be restored during the Biden administration.
Following October 7, 2023, Iran was identified as one of the targets of Israel’s genocidal and occupation policies. Escalating tensions between the two countries turned into war during Donald Trump’s second term as president. First, Iran was weakened by Israel’s heavy attacks on its regional allies, and then by the overthrow of Assad in Syria. On June 13, 2025, Iran found itself at war with Israel. Iran was caught unprepared by its involvement in negotiations with the Trump administration, which were ostensibly indirect but essentially direct.
The death of the Iran nuclear agreement
After the First Israel-Iran War ended, international pressure on Iran increased. In addition to defending itself on the battlefield, Iran needed to develop an effective defense strategy in the diplomatic arena. During the war, Iran suspended its cooperation with the IAEA. It claimed that the Agency’s Board of Governors’ decision on June 12, which stated that Iran had violated its nuclear obligations and provided justification for the Israeli attack, was a result of the Agency inspectors engaging in activities in Iran to provide intelligence to Israel. Iran also suspended negotiations with the U.S. This was because Israel attacked Iran with the approval and support of the U.S. while negotiations were ongoing.
The European Trio (E3), comprising Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, interpreted Iran’s diplomatic break as a violation of the nuclear agreement. On August 28, the E3 countries submitted a complaint to the UN Security Council, alleging that Iran violated its obligations under the 2015 agreement. This triggered the process of reinstating pre-2015 UN sanctions. The agreement stipulated that the issue had to be resolved within 30 days.
During this period, Iran had to convince its counterparts that it was acting in accordance with the agreement. However, this proved impossible. On September 27, the pre-JCPOA UN sanctions against Iran were reinstated following the UN Security Council’s rejection of a resolution submitted by Russia and China to postpone the application of the trigger mechanism for six months.
What happens next?
This decision nullified over a decade of diplomatic efforts by the parties involved. The reimposition of sanctions from before 2015 has begun; however, this step is not expected to have a significant impact on the Iranian economy. This is because the agreement has effectively been defunct since the U.S. withdrew from it in 2018. Furthermore, European companies and international financial institutions have long avoided cooperating with Iran due to concerns over secondary U.S. sanctions.
In this context, the decision’s significance is highlighted under two headings. First, Russia and China may be prevented from selling arms to Iran under UN sanctions. However, both countries have declared that they do not recognize the decision’s legitimacy and will not comply with it. This situation further fuels the debate about the UN Security Council’s legitimacy. The fact that the council, whose legitimacy is already heavily questioned due to the Gaza genocide, has made a decision that increases tension and escalation in the context of Iran will further deepen the crisis in the international system.
Secondly, it is highly likely that Israel will use the decision as a pretext for a new war. Netanyahu wants the current conflict to continue, yet he is facing a serious impasse in Gaza. The recent U.S.-brokered ceasefire initiative led by former President Donald Trump has further constrained Netanyahu’s ability to prolong military operations in Gaza. His diplomatic isolation has also increased, as was recently observed at the UN General Assembly. Given these circumstances, Israel may consider turning to Iran as a lower-cost option than escalating military operations in Gaza. Furthermore, Israel could gain support from European countries on the Iran issue. Indeed, during the first war in June, the German chancellor used the phrase “Israel is doing our dirty work.”
Considering these two factors, the decision is expected to exacerbate the conflict and eliminate the prospect of a peaceful resolution to the debate over Iran’s nuclear program.
Initial Iranian reactions indicate that withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains an option. However, President Pezeshkiyan has emphasized that Iran does not need to withdraw from the NPT as long as its nuclear rights are protected.
This development creates a critical line of tension. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi stated that the agreement reached between Iran and the IAEA in Cairo on September 9 would be nullified if the Security Council reimposed sanctions. Therefore, Iran is expected to carefully evaluate its options in the coming period. Heated debates on this issue are also foreseeable in Iran’s domestic politics.
Mustafa Caner, PhD 
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